

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

ROBERT MURRAY, known as LEVITICUS  
LUCFER,

Plaintiff,

-against-

C.O. PRATT; OMH, MENTAL HEALTH DEPT.;  
D.O.C.; C.O. JOHN DOE; CAPT. JANE DOE;  
CAPT. JOHN DOE; 2 JOHN DOE DEPS.,

Defendants.

22-CV-0638 (JPO)

ORDER OF SERVICE

J. PAUL OETKEN, United States District Judge:

Plaintiff, who is currently detained in the Anna M. Kross Center on Rikers Island, brings this *pro se* action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that while he was detained in “C-95/C-71 heart island [sic],” Defendants violated his rights. By order dated March 15, 2022, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed without prepayment of fees, that is, *in forma pauperis* (IFP).<sup>1</sup>

**STANDARD OF REVIEW**

The Prison Litigation Reform Act requires that federal courts screen complaints brought by prisoners who seek relief against a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. *See* 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a prisoner’s IFP complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A(b); *see Abbas v. Dixon*, 480 F.3d 636, 639

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<sup>1</sup> Prisoners are not exempt from paying the full filing fee even when they have been granted permission to proceed IFP. *See* 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1).

(2d Cir. 2007). The Court must also dismiss a complaint if the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction of the claims raised. *See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).*

While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the court is obliged to construe *pro se* pleadings liberally, *Harris v. Mills*, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and to interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” *Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons*, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude” in *pro se* cases, *id.* at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits – to state a claim, *pro se* pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.

The Supreme Court has held that, under Rule 8, a complaint must include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” *Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly*, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In reviewing the complaint, the court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. *Ashcroft v. Iqbal*, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. *Twombly*, 550 U.S. at 555. After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the court must determine whether those facts make it plausible – not merely possible – that the pleader is entitled to relief. *Id.*

## DISCUSSION

### A. Department of Correction (D.O.C.)

Plaintiff's claims against the D.O.C. must be dismissed because an agency of the City of New York is not an entity that can be sued. N.Y. City Charter ch. 17, § 396 ("[A]ll actions and proceedings for the recovery of penalties for the violation of any law shall be brought in the name of the city of New York and not in that of any agency, except where otherwise provided by law."); *Jenkins v. City of New York*, 478 F.3d 76, 93 n.19 (2d Cir. 2007); *see also Emerson v. City of New York*, 740 F. Supp. 2d 385, 396 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) ("[A] plaintiff is generally prohibited from suing a municipal agency.").

In light of Plaintiff's *pro se* status and clear intention to assert claims against the City of New York, the Court construes the complaint as asserting claims against the City of New York and directs the Clerk of Court to amend the caption of this action to replace the D.O.C. with the City of New York. *See* Fed. R. Civ. P. 21. This amendment is without prejudice to any defenses the City of New York may wish to assert.

### B. Not a Person under Section 1983

Plaintiff's claims against the D.O.C. Mental Health Department must also be dismissed. Section 1983 provides that an action may be maintained against a "person" who has deprived another of rights under the "Constitution and Laws." 42 U.S.C. § 1983. D.O.C. Mental Health Department is not a "person" within the meaning of § 1983. *See Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police*, 491 U.S. 58 (1989) (state is not a "person" for the purpose of § 1983 claims); *Zuckerman v. Appellate Div., Second Dep't Supreme Court*, 421 F.2d 625, 626 (2d Cir. 1970) (court not a "person" within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983); *Whitley v. Westchester Cnty. Corr. Fac. Admin.*, No. 97-CV-420 (SS), 1997 WL 659100, at \*7 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 22, 1997) (correctional

facility or jail not a “person” within the meaning of § 1983). Therefore, Plaintiff’s claim against D.O.C. Mental Health Department is dismissed.<sup>2</sup> See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

**C. Waiver of Service**

The Clerk of Court is directed to notify the New York City Department of Correction and the New York City Law Department of this order. The Court requests that the City of New York and C.O. Pratt waive service of summons.

**D. John Doe Defendants**

Under *Valentin v. Dinkins*, a *pro se* litigant is entitled to assistance from the district court in identifying a defendant. 121 F.3d 72, 76 (2d Cir. 1997). In the complaint, Plaintiff supplies sufficient information to permit the New York City Department of Correction to identify C.O. John Doe; Capt. Jane Doe; Capt. John Doe; and two John Doe Deputies., who Plaintiff alleges were involved in the deprivation of his rights. It is therefore ordered that the New York City Law Department, which is the attorney for and agent of the New York City Department of Correction, must ascertain the identity and badge number of each John Doe whom Plaintiff seeks to sue here and the addresses where the Defendants may be served.<sup>3</sup> The New York City Law Department

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<sup>2</sup> Plaintiff uses the acronym OMH. To the extent that Plaintiff seeks to bring claims against the New York State Office of Mental Health (OMH), these claims are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. “[A]s a general rule, state governments may not be sued in federal court unless they have waived their Eleventh Amendment immunity, or unless Congress has abrogated the states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity . . . .” *Gollomp v. Spitzer*, 568 F.3d 355, 366 (2d Cir. 2009). “The immunity recognized by the Eleventh Amendment extends beyond the states themselves to state agents and state instrumentalities that are, effectively, arms of a state.” *Id.* New York has not waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity to suit in federal court, and Congress did not abrogate the states’ immunity in enacting 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See *Trotman v. Palisades Interstate Park Comm’n*, 557 F.2d 35, 40 (2d Cir. 1977).

<sup>3</sup> If the Doe defendants are current or former DOC employees or officials, the New York City Law Department should note in the response to this order that an electronic request for a waiver of service can be made under the e-service agreement for cases involving DOC defendants, rather than by personal service at a DOC facility. If the Doe Defendants are not

must provide this information to Plaintiff and the Court within sixty days of the date of this order.

Within thirty days of receiving this information, Plaintiff must file an amended complaint naming the John Doe Defendants. The amended complaint will replace, not supplement, the original complaint. An amended complaint form that Plaintiff should complete is attached to this order. Once Plaintiff has filed an amended complaint, the Court will screen the amended complaint and, if necessary, issue an order asking Defendants to waive service.

#### **E. Local Civil Rule 33.2**

Local Civil Rule 33.2, which requires defendants in certain types of prisoner cases to respond to specific, court-ordered discovery requests, applies to this action. Those discovery requests are available on the Court's website under "Forms" and are titled "[Plaintiff's Local Civil Rule 33.2 Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents.](#)" Within 120 days of service of the complaint, Defendants must serve responses to these standard discovery requests. In their responses, Defendants must quote each request verbatim.<sup>4</sup>

#### **CONCLUSION**

The Court dismisses Plaintiff's claims against D.O.C. *See* 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). The Clerk of Court is directed to add the City of New York as a Defendant under Fed. R. Civ. P. 21.

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current or former DOC employees or officials, but otherwise work or worked at a DOC facility, the New York City Law Department must provide a residential address where the individuals may be served.

<sup>4</sup> If Plaintiff would like copies of these discovery requests before receiving the responses and does not have access to the website, Plaintiff may request them from the Pro Se Intake Unit.

The Court also dismisses Plaintiff's claims against D.O.C. Mental Health Department.

*See* 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

The Clerk of Court is directed to electronically notify the New York City Department of Correction and the New York City Law Department of this order. The Court requests that Defendants the City of New York and C.O. Pratt waive service of summons.

The Clerk of Court is further directed to mail a copy of this order and the complaint to the New York City Law Department at: 100 Church Street, New York, New York 10007.

Local Civil Rule 33.2 applies to this action.

The Court certifies under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this order would not be taken in good faith, and therefore IFP status is denied for the purpose of an appeal. *Cf. Coppededge v. United States*, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962) (holding that an appellant demonstrates good faith when he seeks review of a nonfrivolous issue).

The Clerk of Court is directed to mail a copy of this order to Plaintiff, together with an information package.

SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 18, 2022  
New York, New York



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J. PAUL OETKEN  
United States District Judge